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RENT CONTROL AND THE THEORY OF
EFFICIENT REGULATION
Richard A. Epstein*
My introduction to rent control took place before I entered
law school, reflected upon the role of private property in a dem-
ocratic society, or learned about theories of efficient regulation.
It came in 1963, during my senior year at Columbia College
when I was in search of an off-campus apartment. My original
quest turned up a lovely four room apartment on 111th Street
and Amsterdam Avenue, ideal for me and my prospective room-
mate, and a steal at $125 per month. I saw the unit but then was
unable to get the superintendent to reach the building owner to
close the deal. Later I was told by a wise graduate student that
my naivet6 was the source of my undoing. The superintendent
"needed to have his palm smeared" in order to make the appro-
priate connection. Someone else more savvy in the ways of New
York City had made the necessary side payment.
Still, I was not totally defeated in my quest to escape dor-
mitory living, because lucky circumstance is often a fit substi-
tute for the wisdom of the streets. My parents' next door neigh-
bor in the suburbs happened to own an apartment building near
the college. He just had a vacancy when an elderly couple finally
relinquished their rent controlled apartment to move south to
Florida. The former tenants rented in 1943 for about $58.00 and
that figure, with one 15 percent increase in 1953, was still the
rent when, deep into retirement, they vacated in 1963. New
York's rent control law at that time allowed the landlord a 15
percent increase with a change in tenant, so my lease was for
approximately $75.00.1 The favorable lease did not fall my way
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
Columbia College, A.B., 1964; Oxford University, B.A., 1966; Yale Law School, LL.B.,
1968. Stuart Sterk gave valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I should like
to thank Sean Smith for his usual able research assistance in preparing this article.
I For popular accounts of the New York City laws, see Kristof, The Effects of Rent
Control and Rent Stabilization in New York City, in RENT CONTROL: MYTH AND REALI-
Tins 125 (The Fraser Inst. ed. 1981) [hereinafter RENT CONTROL]; Olsen, Questions and
Some Answers About Rent Control: An Empirical Analysis of New York's Experience,
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simply as an act of neighborly benevolence. I had plans to leave
town upon graduation, and then my landlord-neighbor could ob-
tain another increase, hopefully from another student, until the
rent equalled the market rent on an identical unit four stories
above my own - $175.00.
These two incidents, occurring back to back, diverted my
attention from the history of ancient philosophy and made me
pause to think about all the oddities, favoritism, intrigue, and
corruption of New York's system of rent control. I had an un-
easy sense that something was very much awry, but I had little,
if any, sense of the intellectual wellsprings of my discomfort. I
think it is fair to say that intellectual views are shaped (not jus-
tified, but shaped) by one's early experiences, and mine had
clearly predisposed me to be skeptical towards rent control.
Now, twenty-five years later, my skepticism has ripened into
overt hostility. I shall therefore take this occasion to voice my
objections to the rent control system of which I was once a lucky
beneficiary.
In order to make clear these developments, this Article is
divided into four parts. The first part argues that all rent con-
trol statutes, regardless of their peculiar features and structures,
are per se unconstitutional under the takings clause of the Con-
stitution. The second part contrasts my analysis of rent control
with the received judicial interpretation. The third part explains
why the constitutional rule embodies a theory of efficient regula-
tion because it eliminates the distortions that otherwise arise
from the systematic gap between regulated and market prices.
The fourth part examines some of the communtarian justifica-
tions for rent control, and argues that, properly understood,
these justifications are only disguised pleas for privilege and spe-
cial interests.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RENT CONTROL STATUTES
Rent control statutes come in all types, shapes and sizes.2 In
id. at 107.
2 For an exhaustive catalogue of all the variations, see Baar, Guidelines for Drafting
Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (1983), which contains
references to most of the statutory materials, cases and law review literature prior to
1983. Baar's paper assumes the soundness of some system of rent control, and then ad-
dresses the practical problems of drafting, interpreting, and applying such systems.
[Vol. 54: 741
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some instances the law pegs the allowable rent to historic rents
for the unit at some base time. Rent increases may then be al-
lowed upon a change in ownership of the apartment unit, upon
the completion of certain necessary improvements, upon some
formula that reflects the increasing costs of maintenance and re-
pair, upon some general rule that is tied to the consumer price
index or any other neutral yardstick, or even upon proof of ten-
ant or landlord hardship. To understand the actual operation of
any given rent control statute, it is critical to note the ways in
which the permitted rents are computed. Rent control statutes
are not all equally good, or rather, bad. New York's rent stabili-
zation is less of a disaster than the 1942 New York rent control
statute. The responsible lawyer or economic analyst will try to
draw relevant distinctions between them.
At this stage, however, I do not want to stress the differ-
ences among rent control systems, but their similarities. Indeed,
the particulars on rental calculations do more to mislead than to
inform. In this instance, unity does come out of diversity: a clear
grasp of the basic analytics of the situation helps explain why it
is the imposition of controls, and not the form of that imposi-
tion, that brands all rent control statutes as per se unconstitu-
tional, notwithstanding a uniform line of cases that holds to the
contrary.'
The most obvious way to proceed is perhaps through the
takings clause, which provides, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."'4 As I under-
stand it, the eminent domain clause raises three questions ex-
plicitly, and a fourth by necessary implication: first, has private
See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr.
726 (1986), afl'd, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988). For the early cases, see e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921). Note that
there were four dissenters in both Block and Marcus Feldman. For a recent variation on
the traditional theme, see Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 418 N.E.2d 335
(1981), which sustained the power of the state to prevent the removal of housing units
from the rental market, whether by sale or for owner occupation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The arguments here parallel those made in more exhaustive
form in R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
176-77, 186-88 (1985). In principle the argument could run through the contracts clause,
"no state shall pass any law. . . impairing the obligation of contracts," if given the pro-
spective application that was denied it in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213
(1827). I have favored the prospective interpretation in Epstein, Toward a Revitalization
of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984).
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property been taken; second, has that taking been for public use;
third, has just compensation been provided for the property so
taken; and last, is that taking justified under the police power.
There is no mention of the police power at all in the Constitu-
tion. It must be read into the text by implication -without si-
multaneously reading but the explicit protections against un-
compensated takings contained in the Constitution.
Starting with the first question, I take it as given that any
fee simple absolute in possession can be divided into its constit-
uent parts by grant or devise. A lease, like a life estate and a
mortgage, is one of the limited estates that can be carved out of
the fee simple, and it is an ordinary property interest, in fact,
one of the older estates in land. The lease differs from the fee
simple in that it is always created by grant or devise, and never
acquired by initial or adverse possession. The leasehold interest
is therefore born of the contract and conveyance that gives
shape to its terms. For most leases these contract terms take on
considerable heft. For example, the contract will specify dura-
tion, renewal options, assignability, and the duties on each side.
In the world without rent control, the parties regulate some of
these questions by express agreement; others are regulated by
the set of default provisions created by the law. The rent, like
the price in a contract of sale, is one term which is almost always
set by agreement, without which an executory contract for a fu-
ture lease is too indefinite to be enforced. The duration of the
lease is also a term that is virtually always subject to specific
negotiations.
Rent control statutes operate to take part of the landlord's
interest in his reversion and to transfer it to the tenant. In the
typical case they do so by compelling the landlord, usually in the
context of a lease renewal, to convey an additional term of years
for the benefit of the tenant, at a price determined by the state,
typically through a specific administrative board or housing
court established for the purpose.5 That renewed lease is an in-
5I bypass the serious problems of using specialized tribunals to pass upon questions
of law and fact. The danger is that the members of the board will be chosen because they
are champions of one side or another. The moderation that comes from having to select
judges to pass on a wide range of issues is wholly lost, and the risk of ordinary bias, itself
a procedural due process issue, is great. The problem has surfaced in connection with the
first amendment, where specialized censorship boards pose a greater risk to artistic free-
dom than do general courts. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which struck
[Vol. 54: 741
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terest in property, just like the original lease. Its transfer de-
prives the landlord of the immediate right to possession that was
reserved in the original conveyance. The voluntary lease is a
transfer of property from landlord to tenant. The coerced re-
newal of a lease under the rent control statutes is hardly volun-
tary, but it is most surely a transfer from landlord to tenant.
Thus, there is a "taking of private property" both for the stu-
dent of ordinary English and the conveyancing master. Rent
control statutes do not, of course, isolate particular units for
special treatment, but tend to apply to some broad class of
cases, for example, all units rented to tenants as of January 1,
1942. No one would say that the eminent domain clause does not
protect the ordinary owners if an entire district of a city is con-
demned. Likewise, forcing the mass renewal of leases by land-
lords alone only compounds the constitutional wrong of rent
control. It hardly removes the governing regulation from consti-
tutional scrutiny.
In response, it may be said that rent control statutes differ
from the ordinary takings of property for two reasons. The state
does not retain possession of the leasehold term for its own use
through rent control, but directs by ordinance that the tenant
use it for his own enjoyment. Similarly, the state does not pay
any compensation at all, but instead directs the tenant to pay
some set rent to the landlord. At one level, these two features
seem to distinguish rent control from the paradigmatic taking of
land for use as a public school, where the state both keeps the
property and pays the compensation itself.
While these two grounds of distinction are present, they
only make the use of state power more suspect. Viewed analyti-
cally, these differences are relevant not to the first question of
whether property has been taken, but to the next two questions
on the list - has property been taken for public use and has
just compensation been provided. The first of these limitations
is clearly offended by the standard rent control statute. The gen-
down a system of prior restraint in part because it was administered by a board. Black-
stone's concern with licensure raises similar issues:
To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly
done, both before and since the revolution [of 1688] is to subject all freedom of
sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infal-
lible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152.
19881
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eral sense of the public use limitation is that it prevents the tak-
ing of private property from A to give to B. Here A is the land-
lord, B is the tenant, and the leasehold term is the private
property. The additional fact that distinguishes this from the or-
dinary taking is the constructive reconveyance of the property
from the state to the tenant already in possession. Although the
public use clause of the fifth amendment has been largely read
out of the Constitution,' this evasion should not reach the level
of constitutional principle. The standard rent control statute
gives the tenant the identical private ownership that any other
tenant enjoys under an ordinary lease. There is the naked trans-
fer from A to B that the Constitution prohibits, regardless of the
details of the compensation system that is provided.
Let us suppose, however, what is clearly wrong, that the
tenant's welfare is a "public use" (or perhaps an "indirect public
benefit") that saves rent control statutes from this frontal public
use challenge. Rent control statutes still flunk the test of just
compensation, regardless of their details. Every rent control
statute has only one raison d'etre - to insure that the landlord's
rent is kept below the fair market rental of the property. The
many variations in rent control formulae are of critical impor-
tance only if the inquiry is how to measure the difference be-
tween the market rental value and the regulated rental. Depend-
ing on the form, duration, and severity of the regulation, that
differential can be either large, up to 80 or 90 percent of the
market value of property in extreme cases, or small. But so
what? The just compensation inquiry asks whether the landlord
has been supplied with an equivalent in value to the lost prop-
erty interest, so that the landlord is indifferent in economic
terms between retaining the leasehold interest and the substi-
tute compensation the state has provided.
If the state moved A out of a $100,000 house, it could not
satisfy its constitutional obligation by paying A $60,000 in ex-
change: it would still owe $40,000. Now assume that this same
house rented for $10,000 per year. The state cannot escape with
paying A only $6,000. The state has short-changed the landlord
$4,000 per year, even if the tenant's credit is impeccable. If the
lease is renewable in perpetuity, then the shortfall over time be-
' Hawaiian Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
[Vol. 54: 741
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comes the same $40,000 that it is with outright confiscation. The
state's position is hardly made better because the landlord may
look only to the tenant for compensation. Quite the opposite,
this improper delegation of its own duty to compensate only
throws the additional risk of tenant insolvency on the landlord
instead of bearing it itself. Rent control statutes never provide
just compensation to the landlord.
The case for the rent control statutes necessarily rests
therefore upon the police power. Clearly there is some basis for
incorporating this police power exception into the takings clause,
just as some variation of it is incorporated into the first amend-
ment ("clear and present danger") guarantee of freedom of
speech.7 It is quite inconceivable to think that individuals could
shoot the windows out of their neighbors' houses, or pollute ei-
ther private or public waterways.' But the rent control statutes
are not directed towards private misconduct, or toward the
amorphous concerns of public beautification, served by height
and setback restrictions, 9 or even towards the health and safety
of tenants as a class. Even if we assume that the state police
power reaches ventilation, sanitation, and fire prevention, it is
still difficult to include the identity of the tenant, or the amount
of rent paid to the landlord, within the health and safety cate-
gory. The ritual incantation of the good ends served by these
statutes" ignores a realistic assessment of what rent control
statutes do, or how they operate. How are health or safety im-
7 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), to trace the increasing stringency of the requirement.
' See, e.g., Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
" See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), relied on by Justice Holmes in
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921). In Block, Justice Holmes stated: "These cases
are enough to establish that a public exigency will justify the legislature in restricting
property rights in land to a certain extent without compensation. But if, to answer one
need, the legislature may limit height, to answer another it may limit rent." Id. at 156.
Holmes misses the critical line between the control of externalities and the interference
with contract. The state power is far greater in the former than in the latter. For discus-
sion, see Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10-11.
1o "Congress has stated the unquestionable embarrassment of Government and dan-
ger to the public health in the existing condition of things." Block, 256 U.S. at 156. The
theme resurfaces in later cases: "The charter amendment includes in its stated purposes
for imposing rent control the alleviation of the ill effects of the exploitation of a housing
shortage by the charging of exorbitant rents to the detriment of public health and wel-
fare of the city and particularly its underprivileged groups." Birkenfeld v. City of Berke-
ley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 160, 550 P.2d 1001, 1023, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 487 (1976).
1988]
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proved if the landlord is stripped of the financial resources that
are necessary to comply with applicable health and safety regu-
lations? More focused regulations, although themselves a possi-
ble subject of abuse, can deal with whatever health and safety
problems are thought to exist in rental housing, while leaving
rents free to move.
If safety and health will not save these statutes, what will?
Justice Holmes argued that the statutes were justified, if only as
a two-year temporary remedy, to avoid the congestion in Wash-
ington D.C. that resulted from the "sudden influx of people to
Washington caused by the needs of Government and the war."11
With Holmes's formulation, the argument shifts from protection
against private misconduct to the prevention of windfall gains as
a result of a public necessity - the war. Even if this rationale is
accepted, most modern rent control statutes would not come
within it. But the rationale is itself defective because public ne-
cessity does not defeat the obligation to pay compensation. The
problem of public necessity is an old one in the law of torts, as
when government agents are forced to destroy private property
to prevent the spread of a flood, or to resist an invading army.12
Whenever the property destroyed by the government would
have been destroyed in any event, the claim for compensation is
vanishingly small, not because the destruction was justified, but
because the value of the property to its owner just prior to the
taking was at best negligible.' 3 In some cases property is taken
by the government in order to allow it to pursue its common
ends. Public officials should not have to bear the full costs of
those losses individually, for then they would be deprived of all
incentives to provide needed public services. 4 There is no rea-
" Block, 256 U.S. at 157 (regulation giving a tenant the privilege of holding over
after the expiration of the lease so long as he pays the rent and performs the conditions
as fixed by the lease is not unconstitutional because it has a sufficient public interest).
12 See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (1788). See, e.g., Bohlen, Incom-
plete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality,
39 HARv. L. REV. 307 (1926), reprinted in F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 614
(1926) (discussing permissible invasions of another's legally protected interest when done
for a particular purpose).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), where the destruction
of Caltex's oil facilities in Manila before the Japanese takeover was not regarded as a
compensable taking because the Japanese would have taken them in any case.
14 See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 47-
48 (4th ed. 1984), for a brief discussion of the mismatched incentives created by official
[Vol. 54: 741
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son why general taxes could not compensate those made to bear
special losses. The eminent domain power allows the state, for
example, to take lands for defensive installations, and supplies
for troops. Therefore, even public necessity dictates both that
the taking should occur, and that compensation should be pro-
vided, typically from general tax revenues. 15
The necessity of citizens moving to Washington D.C. to aid
in the war is small potatoes next to the usual public necessity
case. In addition, the congestion would have taken care of itself
in fairly short order. If rents had been allowed to rise, more
units would have become available for renting, while the de-
mands of tenants would have been scaled down. The return to
equilibrium, moreover, need not be a long drawn out affair.
Milton Friedman and George Stigler begin their entertaining
1946 attack on rent control by comparing the San Francisco
housing market after the earthquake of 1906 with the same
rental market after rent controls were imposed at the close of
World War II.16 In 1906, there were apartments advertised for
sale within a month after the earthquake, even though over one-
half of the city's available housing stock had been reduced to
rubble within a three-day period. Many people left the city for
temporary shelters elsewhere, while spare rooms were let out to
those who remained, and new construction began at a brisk
pace. In 1946, the housing shortage said to justify rent control
was below 10 percent, but under rent control the housing market
was stagnant, with low vacancy rates.' 7 The moral is clear: con-
gestion is a transitory phenomenon for which the regulatory cure
is worse than the disease.
Even if congestion does give rise to a public necessity, it still
only warrants the same response that is given in the core cases
decided under the principle. 8 The right response is a rental al-
lowance to government employees, funded from general taxes.
liability. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), for the doctrine of qualified
immunity intended to respond to this question.
" For a discussion of this theme, see section I1(A) infra.
16 M. Friedman & G. Stigler, Roofs or Ceilings, The Current Housing Problem, Pop-
ular Essays on Current Problems No. 2, in RENT CONTROL, supra note 1, at 87.
'7 These low rates are characteristic of rent control. For the modern evidence, see
Tucker, Where do the Homeless Come From, NAT'L REV., Sept. 25, 1987, at 32.
" See Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsch,
256 U.S. 135 (1921).
1988]
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There is no justification for a system of comprehensive regula-
tion that imposes the losses on a small fraction of the popula-
tion. Rent control, in a word, does nothing to eliminate wind-
falls; indeed, without the rent control statute any current tenant
gets a windfall for the unexpired term of the lease. In the short
run rent control transfers windfalls from landlords to tenants,
where neither side has any special claim to privilege. 9 In the
long run rent control perpetuates only these windfalls for a se-
lect class of lucky tenants.
II. THE CASE LAW
My analysis of rent control deviates sharply from the re-
ceived wisdom on the subject, which gives the state wide latitude
to impose rent control statutes. It should therefore prove of
some value to examine the difference between my hard-edged
approach and the law as it appears in the decided cases. The
best place to begin is with the current law of rent control, in
order to see how judges respond to the confiscation challenge.
Here I wish to discuss only two important rent control deci-
sions20 in detail: Pennell v. City of San Jose,21 which illustrates
the anomalies that arise from efforts to work within the current
constitutional framework; and Hall v. City of Santa Barbara,22
which illustrates the anomalies that arise from efforts to work
around it.
In general, wide legislative discretion is not identical with
the removal of all constitutional restraints on the process. A
statute which provides for a $1.00 per month rent for all apart-
ments would be struck down, even today, as confiscatory. Once
some limitation on state power is recognized, it becomes neces-
sary to identify which rent control statutes are permissible exer-
19 See section III infra.
20 1 put aside the line of cases that are concerned with the relationship between
state and federal power, most notably, Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 1150 (1986),
where the Court held that the Sherman Act did not preempt the Berkeley rent control
ordinance. Note that. the effort to find antitrust violations from the rent control statutes
often postulate that the landlords have entered into conspiracies to restrict the maxi-
mum prices, against, of course, their own financial interest. The entire preemption issue
is a diversion from the central questions of rent control.
21 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988), aft'g, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1986).
22 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988).
[Vol. 54: 741
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cises of the police power and which are not. The answer is that
the landlord should be entitled to a "just and reasonable re-
turn," a term familiar from the law regulating natural monopo-
lies such as public utilities. This was the standard since the first
decision upholding rent control, Block v. Hirsh,2s and it has
been reiterated in recent cases.24
This intermediate standard is hardly secure because of the
difficulty in finding the investment base on which the rate of
return is calculated. If the original landlord, A, sells the rever-
sion to B for three times the original cost, may B charge a higher
set of rents than those allowable to A, even though the property
has the same market value for both of them? It hardly makes
sense to encourage an otherwise costly sale of real estate for the
sole purpose of minimizing the effect of regulation. Yet just that
is done whenever the regulatory rate of return is based on cost
of acquisition, thereby ignoring the owner's unrealized apprecia-
tion accruing between the time of original purchase and the on-
set of regulation. The Constitution, moreover, clearly requires
this interim appreciation to be taken into account, because just
compensation must reflect the market value, not original cost,
both for the entire fee, and also for any partial interest carved
out of it. 25 The "just and reasonable return" standard does not
afford the landlord fair compensation, and no system of regu-
lated rents can allow a rent control statute to pass constitutional
muster.
This position is strengthened by examining Pennell v. City
of San Jose,28 a recent Supreme Court response to a rent control
challenge. San Jose's rent control statute allowed all landlords
increases under one of three pricing systems: an automatic in-
crease of 8 percent; an increase of 5 percent coupled with a pass
through of certain specified costs; or, finally, an increase to help
finance a mortgage on the regulated property. If dissatisfied with
these formulas, the landlord could petition for an additional in-
crease in rent "reasonable under the circumstances." Among the
23 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
2 For an articulation of the requirement, see, e.g., Property Owners Ass'n v. Town-
ship of North Bergen, 74 N.J. 327, 378 A.2d 25 (1977); Hutton Park Gardens v. West
Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 350 A.2d 1 (1975).
25 For further discussion, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 182-86.
26 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988), af'g, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726
(1986).
1988]
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relevant circumstances were financing costs, maintenance, ser-
vice history, and - "the hardship to the tenant." This last ele-
ment in the hopper was challenged as an improper ground for
denying an increase otherwise warranted. The gist of the chal-
lenge was that "although the purpose to be advanced by the
hardship provisions (providing financial assistance to poor te-
nants) is a proper one, that burden cannot be constitutionally
placed on individual landlords who happen to have hardship
tenants."
2 7
The California Supreme Court rejected this claim holding
that the statute as a whole was not confiscatory given its mini-
mum automatic 8 percent increase." ' The California Supreme
Court added, "The possibility that local governments could ac-
complish the same result through a subsidy from general tax
revenues has never been considered a bar to the validity of such
legislation (on equal protection or any other ground) and we see
no reason why such a possibility should operate to invalidate the
limited reliance on economic hardship that is part of the ordi-
nance under consideration here." 9
By a six-to-two vote, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed in an opinion which can best be described as a judicial
nonevent. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, first in-
sisted that the case was not ripe for consideration since the of-
fensive provision had never been applied in the particular case.30
27 Id. at 371, 721 P.2d at 1115, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
28 Id. at 373, 721 P.2d at 1117, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
2 Id. at 372, 721 P.2d at 1116, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
30 Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 856. The argument here is simply wrong. Where there is a
facial challenge to a statute, there should be no reason to wait until it has been misap-
plied in a particular case. That is certainly the view with respect to statutes that embody
explicit racial classifications, and there is no reason for there to be any difference here, as
Justice Scalia correctly notes in his pointed dissent. Id. at 860. The prematurity line is a
transparent effort to squash constitutional challenges in takings cases. Such efforts have
gained force since the unfortunate misreading of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), by Justice Stevens in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987). In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes found that the Kohler Act was
facially unconstitutional. He made such a finding despite the fact that only one owner
would be affected by the challenged statute. The owner alleged that it would be impossi-
ble for him to profitably engage in his business. In Keystone, however, Justice Stevens
rejected Justice Holmes's findings in Pennsylvania Coal. Justice Stevens concluded that
since Keystone involved only a facial challenge without a similar complaint as in Penn-
sylvania Coal, it would be impossible to hold the statute unconstitutional. Further, the
constitutionality of statutes cannot be determined except when a particular factual set-
ting makes such a determination necessary. I have criticized this development in Ep-
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He then reiterated his view that rent control, at least as a gen-
eral matter, was unquestionably constitutional because its "as-
serted purpose" of "prevent[ing] excessive and unreasonable
rent increases" caused by the "growing shortage of and increas-
ing demand for housing in the City of San Jose" is a "legitimate
exercise of appellees' police powers."31 The very conditions that
rent control creates - shortages - is used to constitutionally
justify the practice. The less said about so feeble an argument
the better.
Justice Scalia's dissent incisively analyzed the political
economy of rent control statutes. He began with the familiar
"disproportionate impact" theme so crucial to assessing whether
government takings are in fact compensated.2 As conventionally
developed, the takings clause is "designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole." 33 The objection to the San Jose scheme is that so long as
public aid is a public function, it should be treated like a public
function and discharged from general revenues; not inflicted
upon landlords, or even cotenants, who just "happen" to house,
or live in the same building as, the protected class of tenants.34
stein, supra note 9, at 13-15.
31 Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 857.
32 Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). The phrase
itself has seen the ebb and flow of judicial fortunes. It was largely buried by Justice
Brennan in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), who
claimed that "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' to
determine when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately con-
centrated on a few persons." Id. at 123-24. However, it has been resurrected in Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in No~lan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987),
in which the California Coastal Commission could not condition grant of permission to
rebuild house on owner's transfer of public easement across property without paying
compensation. Nollan is further discussed in Epstein, supra note 9, at 31-44.
34 Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 864 (quoting Property Owners Ass'n v. Township of North
Bergen, 74 N.J. 327, 339, 378 A.2d 25, 31 (1977)). In North Bergen, the statute in ques-
tion limited the increases that could be charged to persons over sixty-five whose income
fell below a certain level. The ordinance at issue provided that the landlord could recap-
ture the foregone rents from either additional increases on unprotected tenants or from a
general town subsidy. The court, however, thought that the general tax obligation could
not be placed on either the landlord or the cotenants. The California Supreme Court in
Pennell tried gallantly to distinguish the precedent, 42 Cal. 3d at 372-73 n.9, 721 P.2d at
1116-17 n.9, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32 n.9, on the ground that the only defect in the
statute was that it did not provide adequate assurance that the landlord could make the
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As Justice Scalia pointedly noted, the rent control statute had
important political consequences:
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it per-
mits wealth transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved other-
wise; but rather that it permits them to be achieved "off budget," with
relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal demo-
cratic processes. San Jose might, for example, have accomplished
something like the result here by simply raising the real estate tax
upon rental properties and using the additional revenues thus ac-
quired to pay part of the rents of "hardship" tenants. It seems to me
doubtful, however, whether the citizens of San Jose would allow funds
in the municipal treasury, from wherever derived, to be distributed to
a family of four with income as high as $32,400 a year - the generous
maximum necessary to qualify automatically as a "hardship" tenant
under the rental ordinance.35
There are two points of note in this passage. First, Scalia
was clearly at pains to reconcile his rejection of the San Jose
ordinance with his own belief that economic decisions are best
entrusted to "normal democratic processes." 8 Scalia was able to
effectuate his reconciliation only by giving the word "normal"
normative as well as descriptive component. Descriptively, there
is nothing more commonplace than having democratic processes
generate systems of "off budget" financing. Most regulations are
themselves disguised forms of taxation,37 designed to create the
mismatch between the benefit and burdens of public programs.
The point is clear with respect to rent control because the sys-
tem of regulation, for example, allows local citizens to vote for
programs, the costs of which are borne by nonlocal landlords. To
say that off budget legislation is not part of normal political
processes is to place a very powerful normative constraint on
recovery. But North Bergen was also concerned with the inequities of the burden when it
observed that "when a landlord is entitled to additional rents, the initial burden falls
exclusively upon the shoulders of the non-Senior Tenants who in a given case may be
financially less capable of bearing the increase than the Senior Tenants." North Bergen,
74 N.J. at 338, 378 A.2d at 30.
3' Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Compare Scalia, On the Merits of the Frying Pan, 1985 REG. 10, reprinted as
Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703 (1985) (Justice Scalia's points
on the issue), with Epstein, The Active Virtues, 1985 REGULATION 14, reprinted as Ep-
stein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Types of Error, 4 CATO J. 711 (1985) (my
response to Justice Scalia).
37 See, e.g., Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22
(1971).
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what legislatures can do and how they can behave.
Second, Scalia's approach cannot be confined to the objec-
tionable "hardship" features of the San Jose law. His political-
process objection to the San Jose ordinance applies to all forms
of rent control - indeed to all forms of regulation generally.3 8
Rent control always involves at least an implicit subsidy of some
tenants by some landlords. Even if tenants as a class are entitled
to the subsidy, why should unwilling landlords alone provide it?
If the state wants this program, it can use tax dollars to con-
demn buildings outright or build anew. The stock so acquired
can then be leased to tenants at below-market rents. At that
point the gap between the market value and the regulated value
is brought "on budget," to be financed by tax revenues as
Scalia's "normal" democratic processes require. Along with
Scalia, I think that very few systems of rent control would be
approved by voters if tax-funded financing were required across
the board. Rent control is expensive, and public financing forces
those who make the decisions to impose that system to also bear
its costs. Only then do we get an honest revelation of the inten-
sity of public preferences. This proportionate impact does more
than distribute the costs of government programs. It has the de-
sirable allocative consequence of reducing the frequency of un-
desirable government programs in the first instance. Scalia's sin-
gle constraint on democratic politics has, I believe, an explicit
basis in the takings clause. It also has the unintended capacity
to transform the structure of modern takings law.
Hall v. City of Santa Barbara39 is a notable attempt to
work around the received constitutional framework for rent con-
trol statutes. The Halls, owners of the Los Amigos Mobile Home
Estates, sought to invalidate a 1984 Santa Barbara City ordi-
nance that required the owners of mobile home parks to offer
tenants leases on their spots for an unlimited duration. Under
the mandatory leases, the tenant could terminate the lease at
will, but the landlord could terminate only for cause as narrowly
defined in the statute. The law also limited the landlord's an-
nual rental increases over the indefinite leasehold term. Finally,
28 For a discussion of the same point in connection with the funding of health and
life insurance for AIDS victims, see Epstein, AIDS, Testing and the Workplace, 1988 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 33.
3 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1987).
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the ordinance allowed the tenant to sell the mobile home and
simultaneously assign the lease on the same favorable terms the
tenant had enjoyed. The complaint alleged that the value of mo-
bile homes dramatically increased after the passage of the ordi-
nance, because the tenant could now assign a valuable leasehold
estate with the sale of the mobile home.
The statute in Hall is a manifest constitutional travesty.
Before the imposition of the ordinance, the market value of the
landlord's interest reflected the potential appreciation in the
value of the plot after expiration of the lease. After the ordi-
nance, the landlord was in effect demoted to a secured creditor
whose rate of return, while variable, was strictly limited by the
percentage increases allowable under the ordinance. The differ-
ence in value between the former equity and the present secur-
ity interests determines the amount of compensation otherwise
owing. The case law, however, required a very different treat-
ment of the issue. If Hall had involved an ordinary apartment
lease, the statute would pass muster if the statutory return met
the elusive just and reasonable return standard.
In Hall, Judge Kozinski ingeniously invoked two arguments
to show that this statute was special and thus escaped the con-
straints of existing case law.40 First, he relied upon the now stan-
dard, if largely unintelligible, Supreme Court distinction be-
tween those takings that involve permanent physical invasion of
the property owner's land, and those that were mere regulations
of use: the former are subject to far higher levels of scrutiny
than the latter, and indeed are sometimes said to be compensa-
ble takings per se. Second, he noted that this rent control stat-
ute allowed the tenant to transfer unconditionally his leasehold,
in contrast to the normal rent control statute that denies the
tenant such free alienability. Neither distinction passes muster,
but both illustrate the rickety nature of the present doctrinal
structure.
The point of departure for Judge Kozinski's first argument
was Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.41 In this
'0 Note that the deviation from existing case law prompted a motion for a rehearing
in banc which was denied over three dissents. The dissent argued that ordinary rent
control precedents governed this case. See id. at 209.
41 458 U.S. 419 (1982). I have commented on this case at length in Epstein, Not
Deference But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 351.
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1982 decision, the Supreme Court held that the city had to pay
compensation when it authorized Teleprompter to place its
wires and switchboxes on private property without the consent
of the owner. The court found there was a permanent physical
invasion of the subject property. Although the invasion was triv-
ial in the extreme, it triggered an automatic per se rule that de-
manded compensation. The stringent standard of Loretto thus
contrasts sharply with the more relaxed standard of review ap-
plied when takings challenges are directed to "mere restrictions"
upon use or development, found for example in the landmark
preservation cases.42 Historically, the rent control cases have al-
ways been decided under the lower "mere regulation" standard.
However, Judge Kozinski argued that the Loretto standard gov-
erned: the mobile home owner parked the vehicle on land owned
by the mobile park owner, a clear physical invasion.
Unfortunately, every rent control statute contemplates a
forced and complete occupation of the landlord's premises by
an unwanted tenant, albeit not his mobile home. Indeed, if the
statutes did provide for a transfer of possession to the tenants,
then they could not be passed. A statute that simply set maxi-
mum allowable rents and permitted landlords to choose their te-
nants would still strip landlords of huge portions of their capital
value in the apartment. But it would not transfer that wealth to
the present tenants who supported passage of the statute. The
landlord could relet the premises at the end of term to different
tenants, so that the present tenants would in effect be using re-
sources and votes to make gifts to strangers instead of transfers
to themselves - an unlikely outcome given the politics of self-
interest. The automatic renewal feature insures that the tenants
capture the full gains of their legislative efforts by allowing them
to maintain perpetual possession of the premises. It is an essen-
tial part of the political process. Yet mysteriously no cases have
treated the tenant's occupation as the kind of permanent physi-
cal invasion that requires a high standard of review.
The root conceptual difficulty lies with the Supreme Court's
insistence that certain incidents of ownership, that is, mere use
and disposition, 3 are in some way intrinsically less deserving of
12 See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
43 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (disposition of statutorily protected
bird species); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (use of land prohib-
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protection than others. All deprivations of property rights
should be subject to the same standards of scrutiny."" On the
critical question of compensation, small takings may bring with
them collateral benefits that leave the landowner better off than
before, so that explicit cash compensation is not required. Yet
by the same token, the "reasonable" rate of return in rent con-
trol cases is designed not to provide full compensation to the
landlord, even when the full package of side benefits is taken
into account. It is only when the takings side and the benefit
side of the government action are blurred together that the fa-
miliar distinction between physical invasion and mere regulation
looks plausible. But when the full effects of various government
actions are unpacked - burden by burden, benefit by benefit -
then the distinction between permanent physical invasion and
mere regulation, on which Judge Kozinski built his Hall opinion,
does not survive. Hall reaches the right result, but only because
all rent control statutes are unconstitutional, not because this
statute is any worse than the others.
A parallel analysis applies to Judge Kozinski's second pur-
ported distinction in Hall, the tenant's right to assign the lease.
Most rent control statutes place implicit restrictions upon the
ability of the lessee to assign his interest in exchange for cash or
other valuable consideration. Removing this restriction simply
makes explicit the total amount of uncompensated transfer that
the rent control system works. The increased value of the lease-
hold interest is offset, if not exceeded, by a parallel loss in the
value of the landlord's reversion. 5 The tenant's assignment of
the term only publicly ratifies what economic theory makes clear
in any event. But why is the right to sell the tenant's interest
intrinsically objectionable? Under the usual rent control scheme,
the tenant is often reluctant to vacate the premises because he
ited by town safety ordinance); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155 (1958) (War Production Board prohibition on use of gold mine and use and disposi-
tion of mining equipment and material); and Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 364 (1926) (use
of land restricted by zoning regulations).
" I pursue this line of reasoning in Epstein, supra note 9, based on an analysis of
the recent Supreme Court cases of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987), First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987), and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). For
an explicit rejection of my approach, and a qualified acceptance of the present distinc-
tion, see Michelman, "Takings," 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming) 1988.
" In practice the total value of the property should drop. See note 46 infra.
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then must sacrifice the valuable term to the landlord, while re-
ceiving nothing in exchange. The landlord may be willing to pay
the tenant to regain possession of the premises. If the leasehold
is not freely assignable, then there is a familiar bilateral monop-
oly situation where each side bargains for a larger share of the
gains. Those bargaining problems are eliminated by a clear rule
of tenant assignability, one that countenances an "efficient"
once-and-for-all expropriation instead of a clumsy holdout prob-
lem on renegotiation.
Kozinski's opinion in Hall subjects this "efficient" form of
confiscation to a higher standard of review than is imposed on
the standard, inefficient, and clumsy forms of rent control. The
present distinction may make some sense in that "efficient" con-
fiscation rules may encourage the passage of more rent control
schemes in the first place. But I suspect that no such functional
reason accounts for the political decision to limit the tenant's
right to assign the rent-controlled lease in a market transaction.
Rent control is politically palatable and constitutionally allowa-
ble because it is a form of disguised confiscation. Once that con-
fiscation is made explicit, the practice cannot survive criticism.46
When the tenant sells the landlord's reversion and pockets the
landlord's money, the situation becomes clear enough for all to
see. Hall embodies an unconstitutional rent control scheme, but
no more so than any other.
III. INEFFICIENT REGULATION: THE GAP BETWEEN MARKET AND
REGULATED RENT
In this section I want to pass beyond the constitutional is-
sues to the social ones. In general, economists, unlike urban
planners, are well nigh unanimous in their condemnation of rent
46 See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 270-71 (1974). Nozick makes the
same point in explaining why subletting is normally not allowed for rent controlled
apartments even though it improves the position of both the tenant and the subtenant
without hurting that of the landlord:
So why do people find the subletting-allowed scheme unacceptable? It defect is
that it makes explicit the partial expropriation of the owner. Why should the
renter of the apartment get the extra money upon the apartment's being sub-
let, rather than the owner of the building? It is easier to ignore the question of
why he should get the subsidy given him by the rent-control law, rather than
this value's going to the owner of the building.
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control statutes.4" The connection between those concerns and
my takings analysis are far closer than might appear at first
sight. The linkage is found in the just compensation theme that
weaves itself through both the constitutional text and the eco-
nomic measures of social welfare. In general economists have al-
ternated between two standards: the Pareto standard of optimal
efficiency and the potential compensation test.48
The Pareto standard of efficiency49 requires that all persons
in the new state of affairs be at least as well off as they were in
the old state of affairs, with at least one person better off. The
evaluations of whether someone is better or worse off rests on
each individual's subjective evaluation of personal welfare,
where it is taken as given that interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity are not possible. Within this framework the actual payment
of compensation allows the winners of certain legislative pro-
grams to buy off the losers with cash, leaving both groups better
off than before. Applied to the rent control context, it means
that cash payments from tenant to landlord will be necessary in
order to insure that the tenant's gain does not result in any re-
duction in landlord welfare. Yet to state the proposition in that
form indicates why rent control fails the Pareto test. The land-
lord is left worse off under rent control than without it. Ordinary
contracts avoid this problem because they leave both sides bet-
ter off, by their own subjective valuations.
In many circumstances, however, the actual payment of
compensation might be regarded as difficult to execute, espe-
cially for widespread, comprehensive regulation. The rival
Kaldor-Hicks, 0 or potential compensation test, responds to
these administrative problems. It stipulates that a legislative ini-
tiative is appropriate if the winners could hypothetically pay
compensation to the losers in such amounts that both sides
would regard themselves as better off from the initiative having
'7 Frey, Pommerelme, Schneider & Gilbert, Consensus and Dissension Among
Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 986 (1984), notes that fewer than
2 percent of the economists surveyed disagreed with the proposition that a "ceiling on
rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing available." That figure represented the
lowest level of disagreement on any point of policy.
41 For a general discussion, see Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximiza-
tion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980).
19 Id. at 488.
80 Id. at 491.
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been put into effect, even if the money is not actually paid. In
essence this rule tolerates the one-sided gains to the tenants so
long as they could have provided the landlords with sufficient
cash transfers to make them better off under the regulation.
The Kaldor-Hicks formula is in obvious conflict with the
Pareto standard. By removing a requirement for actual compen-
sation, the Kaldor-Hicks formula works at cross purposes with
the explicit language of the takings clause. All the important dif-
ferences, practical and otherwise between the two standards,51
apply to the distribution of net social gains. If the prior distri-
bution of benefits were 10 to 10, the Kaldor-Hicks formula
would permit a statute that introduced a new distribution of 15
to 8. The Pareto standard would forbid this result but would
tolerate a further expenditure of 1 in order to achieve, say a 12/
12 or even an 11/13 split. Both standards, however, share one
critical common feature: they categorically preclude changes
which reduce the total stock of wealth (or utility) within the
overall social system. If the winners gain less than the losers
lose, then they cannot make any compensation - hypothetical
or real - to the losers that leave both sides better off. If rent
control statutes always yield such negative sum games, then
they should be rejected uniformly under either standard. The
per se invalidation of rent control under the takings clause is
thus consistent with any efficient theory of social regulation.
In order to show how this is the case, I propose to organize
the discussion around the systematic distortions created in both
the short and long run by the systematic gap between market
and regulated rentals. In the short term, the analysis focuses on
(A) tenant decisions on whether to renew or vacate, and (B) the
litigation between landlord and tenant over violations of various
"for cause" provisions in the lease. In the long run, it focuses on
the (C) incentives for new construction, and (D) the spillover of
market transactions into politics.
A. Tenant Decisions to Vacate or Remain
Let us begin with the static analysis, which assumes that
51 The Pareto standard often highly restricts what can be done. The Kaldor-Hicks
standard often leaves it unclear whether the hypothetical compensation required would
be forthcoming. Neither standard provides any guidance on how the gains from produc-
tive activities should be split between the two parties.
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the supply of housing within a given community is fixed, so that
the only question is its allocation. For sake of argument I shall
assume that the market is competitive in form, a good approxi-
mation of all rental markets. 2 Competitive markets have the
virtue of always forcing each resource user to measure his de-
mand for the resource against the strongest best rival claim, so
that at renewal the tenant in possession has to decide whether
the rental demanded is worth it to him in terms of benefits fore-
gone. As the overall demand becomes greater, rents will increase,
and some tenants will decide to vacate, while those who remain
will enjoy a diminished gain from the transaction (their "con-
sumer surplus") equal to the difference between their reserva-
tion price and the new increased rental price. The nonrenewal of
leases should not be regarded as a bad social event because
someone else with a greater willingness to pay now enjoys the
unit.
It is always possible, of course, that some present tenants
will have a high subjective utility for a given place, which they
cannot back with dollars. In principle the higher payments do
not guarantee higher subjective attachment to the premises, as-
suming that these interpersonal comparisons are viable in this
setting. Nonetheless, there is no effective way to know which
particular tenant falls into this elusive class, and there is a very
substantial reason to fear that the correlation between high util-
ity and great willingness to pay will be strongly positive: some
tenants have high income and low benefits from the use for the
premises; new rivals may have both high income and high sub-
jective utility. The advantage of the wealth test is that it offers a
very good proxy for subjective utility, which is not subject to
strategic misrepresentation common with subjective demands
not backed with dollars.53 The market test works to match per-
sons with premises, with a minimum of fuss, bother, and politi-
cal intrigue.
The introduction of the rent control statute of necessity
62 As of 1980, 58.2 percent of all rental units in the United States were located in
structures with four units or less. The proposition is approximately 10 percent lower in
central cities. See Baar, supra note 2, at 732 n.27. It is highly doubtful that huge num-
bers of these small buildings are owned by single large operators. There is also little
reason to think that the percentages have changed markedly in the last eight years.
'3 See generally Johnsen, Wealth Is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1986) (discussing
the role of social wealth maximization in legal analysis).
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changes the decision function for the tenant in ways that frus-
trate the social welfare. No longer will the tenant compare the
subjective use of the property to its market value, which repre-
sents a minimum estimate of the subjective use of some rival
tenant. Instead the tenant will compare the subjective value of
leasehold renewal with the lower regulated rent. Whenever the
subjective valuation is greater than the regulated price, but
lower than the market one, there is an allocative blunder, as the
private decision to remain ignores the greater cost inflicted upon
some potential rival. The larger the gap between the market and
the regulated price, the greater the divergence between private
and social cost.
Nonetheless, turnover will occur whenever the subjective
value to the tenant falls below the regulated rental. The ques-
tion is who gets the vacant unit given that demand under regula-
tion is far in excess of supply. Since rents cannot move freely
upward, nonprice systems of allocation will be used. Where the
landlord controls the process, there will be a tendency to select
those tenants with very low risk. Hence the system favors
friends and connections, the way in which I got my Columbia
College apartment in 1963. If this approach is blocked, then a
queue will form for the now available units, and prospective te-
nants will vie for a place at the front, which can be obtained by
making side payments to the right person. Hence the common
practice of paying key money to vacating tenants, or of greasing
the palm of the superintendent, again as happened with me in
New York in 1963. Rent control thus introduces distortions on
the ending of old leases and forming of new ones. Applied in
countless cases in large cities, it leads to stagnation and social
dislocation.
B. For Cause Provisions
The gap between market and regulated rents also imposes
pressure on ongoing lease arrangements. It is a commonplace ob-
servation that regulation cannot be effective if it applies only to
a single dimension of a relationship, such as price. Who would
renew a short-term lease on losing terms? Hence rent control
statutes spawn elaborate provisions that specify when renewal
may be forced by the tenant. If reletting units as rental property
is still covered by the rent control laws, then the landlord will
try to remove the unit from the rental market. The landlord can
1988l
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occupy the unit, convert it into nonresidential property or into
rental units not covered by the statute, or sell it as a condomin-
ium. The farsighted regulator (that is, any regulator burned
once) will, therefore, take steps to prevent these depletions of
the rental stock, with the blessing of the court. 4
It is insufficient, of course, to close the escape hatch on re-
newal while eviction is left unregulated. Some battles will mi-
grate to the "for cause" language of the statutes,55 just as they
do in the employment cases of wrongful dismissal s.5  For cause
eviction within the context of a lease is nothing new, and the
grounds specified in the rent control statutes (nuisance, waste,
nonpayment) are essentially those found in the ordinary residen-
tial leases, especially those of long duration. But there is a criti-
cal difference between the impact of the for cause provisions of
the lease and the rent control statutes: far greater pressure is
placed upon the for cause provisions in the regulated than in the
market context.
In the ordinary unregulated market, the landlord has little
incentive to manipulate for cause requirements in order to re-
move a well-behaved tenant. Even a tenant who has committed
small infractions is probably safe, as removing this tenant costs
the landlord a certain amount of labor, money, and heartache. If
the rental market is stable, the landlord can obtain at best only
a small increase from reletting the premises. Even when the
market has moved, it is often cheaper for the landlord to obtain
See, e.g., Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 383 Mass. 152, 418 N.E.2d 335 (1981), in
which the power to prevent the removal of units from the market was upheld as a proper
incident of the city's power, received by delegation from the state, to regulate rentals:
The power to control rents and evictions is not so illusory that it does not
comprehend the right and responsibility of preventing removals from its reach.
We conclude that the power to control removals from the rental housing mar-
ket is essential to the operation of c. 36 [the Cambridge ordinance] and is
therefore conferred by implication in the rent control statute.
Id. at 159, 418 N.E.2d at 339.
55 See Baar, supra note 2, at 833-34. Baar lists nine specific grounds of for cause
removal: nonpayment of rent, failure to cure, creation of nuisance, illegal use, refusal to
afford landlord access to premises for the purpose of repairs or showing the unit to a
potential purchaser or mortgagee, refusal to execute required lease extensions, unautho-
rized subletting, use by landlord's family, permanent removal from housing market, or
any other good cause "not in conflict with the purposes of the rent control act." Id.
56 For an early and influential statement of the dominant position, see Blades, Em-
ployment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967). For my dissent, see Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947 (1984).
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the rent increase at renewal and not to angle for an earlier and
unwarranted dismissal for cause.
However, the rent control laws radically increase the land-
lord's returns from for cause dismissal. As noted earlier, the net
value to a tenant who lives in a rent controlled apartment often
equals in present value terms a very large share of the total fair
market value of the unit. Removal for cause typically allows the
landlord to recapture a substantial portion of the unit's value,
for example, by removing the unit from controls by "rehabbing"
it, or by selling it as a condominium. Now the battle over for
cause dismissal is a high stakes affair. Small deviations from the
leasehold provisions therefore are no longer small items for the
parties to resolve by informal adjustments. The landlord has
strong incentives to exploit minor breaches in order to escape
rent control laws.
This change in incentive structure also often leads the par-
ties to adopt weird forensic positions. A landlord may let the
premises fall into disrepair, only for the tenant to make the im-
provements himself (Having the landlord make improvements
creates for the tenant the risk of a rent increase that may con-
tinue even after the costs of the improvement have been paid
for, at least under the old New York scheme.). In the ordinary
market context, a tenant on a short-term lease is reluctant to
make improvements without some assurance of renewal from the
landlord. The landlord is usually willing to allow the tenant to
make such improvements unless there is some actual impair-
ment of the underlying premises, for the landlord gains the
residual value of the improvements at the expiration of the
lease.
The incentives under rent control are radically different.
The landlord is no longer concerned with losing the value of the
improvement after the expiration of the lease: indefinite renewal
by legal command solves that problem. Instead, the landlord
may well attack the improvement as a form of "waste," which
justifies evicting the tenant under the for cause standard. For
example, in Rumiche Corp. v. Eisenreich 7 the landlord of a
rent-controlled unit allowed the apartment to fall into disrepair,
inducing the tenant to make several alterations of the structure
5 40 N.Y.2d 174, 352 N.E.2d 125, 386 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976).
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that repaired falling ceilings and added certain amenities to the
unit. The landlord sued for "equitable" waste on the ground
that the substantial alteration of the structure did not meet the
standards of the fire code, and were otherwise improper, sub-
stantial, and permanent changes in the leased premises. The
New York Court of Appeals rejected this challenge on the
ground that the statute, not the lease, determined the grounds
for dismissal, and that the changes did nothing to alter the es-
sential nature of the unit as a studio apartment. 8 Given the
framework of the statute, the decision seems correct. But my
point is that litigation of this sort only arises because of the gap
between market and regulated price, rather than any concern
with the condition of the rented unit.59 The lesson will not be
lost on other tenants.
In many instances, however, the problem with waste may
take on more ominous proportions. From the landlord side, the
reduction in rent may well yield a reduction in the level of ser-
vices that can be provided, including matters of maintenance
and security. 0 There is also a substantial peril from the tenant
side. The tenant may have some incentive to keep his own unit
up, but there is no powerful incentive to maintain common ar-
eas. Tenants know that eviction procedures are slow, cumber-
some, and costly to the landlord. Tenants also know that only a
serious violation of the rules will prompt a landlord to sue. Even
if most tenants are virtuous, the common areas can be destroyed
by those who are not. One market function of landlords is to
police harmful interactions among tenants. That role is compro-
mised by the elaborate for cause protections under rent control.
'8 Id. at 180, 352 N.E.2d at 129, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
This problem can and does arise in the private law, as with the perfect tender
suits in nineteenth century sales cases. Often a buyer might reject fungible goods for
some trivial defect, not because the defect influenced the value of the goods, but because
the market had fallen in the interim. See, e.g., Filley v. Pope, 115 U.S. 213 (1885); Nor-
rington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188 (1885). Note that in some cases the game playing by
buyers is something that the parties will want to avoid. This can be done by varying the
terms of the standard contract when appropriate, an option foreclosed by the rent con-
trol statutes.
60 RENT CONTROL, supra note 1, makes this point by interspersing pictures of rent
controlled properties and bombed out properties and challenges the reader to guess
whether he is looking at "Bomb Damages or Rent Control." The answers are at page 320.
Good luck.
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C. Long-Term Investment
The gap between market and regulated rents also has an
effect upon both the long-term operation of the rental housing
supply, and upon the operation of the political process. A rent
control statute is in part a form of price control, and like all
price controls, it results in a systematic gap between the large
quantity of goods demanded (because the price is low) and the
small quantity of goods supplied (for the same reason). Without
regulation, the price would rise, the demand would ease, and the
supply would increase until the market was back in equilibrium,
as happened in San Francisco after the earthquake. 1 But with
the obvious form of redress effectively controlled, some other
forms of conduct are necessary to narrow the gap between sup-
ply and demand. Two common methods are the queue and the
side payment mentioned earlier. By the former, the price to the
individual buyer is increased by having to wait to get the goods
in question. If the wait is long enough, the price paid by the
purchaser (the sum of the transfer payment plus the wait) will
just clear the market. However, the wait will do nothing to in-
crease the supply of the goods because the price paid does not go
to the seller, and therefore does not induce anyone to bring new
rental units on to the market. Even if new construction is ex-
empt from the statute,62 existing rent control laws give a loud
and clear signal that old policies may be reversed so that future
units may be subject to similar restrictions. That prospect is,
moreover, far from negligible because once those units are occu-
pied, their residents add a new class of voters to the rolls whose
interests can no longer be ignored in the political calculus. All
rent control statutes thus depress the future total return of any
investment. Reduced returns mean reduced investments, so that
rent control statutes only exacerbate the housing shortages they
are said to alleviate.
"' See Baar, supra note 2, at 759 (discussing exemptions for new construction which
are common in rent control laws and intended to encourage such activity).
2 In Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 199 (1921), Justice
Holmes noted that "as to new buildings, that the unknown cost of completing them and
the need to encourage such structures sufficiently explain" why these are excluded from
the operation of the statute. Note that both Block and Marcus Brown dealt with rent
control statutes that applied to units already in existence.
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D. The Political Dimension
As hinted above, the rent control statutes also have very
powerful and unfortunate political overtones. The gap between
regulated and market rentals is not fixed by an act of nature. It
must be determined in political markets. But the operation of
these markets differs in a notable way from that of ordinary
rental markets. In the usual private market, both landlord and
tenant have made specific investments in an ongoing relation-
ship that is subject to the risk of strategic behavior at renewal.
The tenant must incur the costs of finding new premises if the
landlord raises the rental above market, while the landlord faces
the costs of finding a new tenant if the present tenant will not
agree to any increase. Yet in the private market, both landlord
and tenant are reluctant to exploit the vulnerability of the other
side for fear of retaliation. A quick and easy agreement on re-
newal spares both sides the risk and cost of protracted conflict,
and is the norm in most housing markets, where present tenants
usually face increases similar to those required of newly arriving
tenants. The bilateral holdout problem is effectively controlled
by increasing the number of alternative opportunities available.
"Thick" markets work more smoothly than "thin" ones.
The situation is far more complex with rent control because
some collective decision is necessary to decide the permissible
level of rent increases. Instead of having competitive markets
make the decision, the law must necessarily introduce political
formulas whereby the majority of voters within the jurisdiction,
subject only to loose constitutional rate of return constraints,
determine the formula for allowable increases. The political bat-
tles are often ugly, acrimonious, and uncivilized. The costs are
extensive, given the very wide bargaining range between the
market and the minimum allowable regulated rents. Factional
struggle can dissipate the gains that are otherwise generated by
voluntary exchange. 3 The 1942 New York law, like other older
statutes, was so rigid and oppressive that it decimated the hous-
ing stock of New York for a generation by forcing the abandon-
ment of many units. More modern stabilization statutes con-
" See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R.
Tollison & G. Tullock eds. 1980). For its application to constitutional matters, see Ep-
stein, supra note 4, at 713-14.
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stantly speak of "fair rates" of return on the model of public
utility regulation. But even here there is always the danger that
the regulations will overshoot their mark, so that some landlords
will find it profitable to first milk and then abandon their units,
which become a source of urban plight and public mismanage-
ment."' While the law may require some reasonable rate of re-
turn, there is many a slip between cup and lip. The restrictions
on rents, coupled with increases in taxes, may force many land-
lords into bankruptcy.
The question then arises, why use the rate of return system
of regulation at all? Consider the reason why utility rate regula-
tion is adopted. The services supplied are characterized by in-
creasing returns to scale, which means typically that a single
supplier can provide the goods more cheaply than two or more
competitive firms, which must incur heavy duplicative fixed
costs. Regulation may therefore be justified as a way to insure
that the single producer does not extract the monopoly profit
from the consumers so served. Similarly, some constitutional re-
straints65 are necessary to insure that investors in the regulated
industry do not have their capital confiscated by state regula-
tion. This system of regulation is both costly and uncertain but
one can envision the allocative gains that it is supposed to
generate.
But the differences between utility regulation and rent con-
trol are critical. Rent control does not displace an unchecked
'4 See Daley & Meislin, New York City, the Landlord: A Decade of Housing Decay,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1. The news article recounts in painful detail the
difficulties that New York City has in running housing units that it acquired in tax fore-
closure or after abandonment. Nonetheless, the article has no sense of the structural
reasons for the vast increase in housing failures. Thus, it states, "At the start, the city
was slow to seize buildings from unscrupulous or inept landlords and when it finally did
the properties were rundown." Id. at col. 2. There is no hint of the role of regulatory
restrictions and tax policy in the rate of housing failures.
11 Today there are precious few. See the decline in the level of review from Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), to Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591 (1944). For an excellent account of the overall problem, see Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in
which Judge Bork argues for the more vigorous standard of review than had been tradi-
tionally applied by lower courts under the Hope test. I have urged a return to Smyth v.
Ames in R. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 274-77. Note that the case for any regulation of a
national monopoly is itself problematic. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L.
& ECON. 55 (1968); Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548
(1968).
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natural monopoly. Instead, it is used as a substitute for what
could be a highly, though surely not perfectly, competitive mar-
ket. The market failure arguments do not work for rental hous-
ing. What is missing in the case for rent control is the identifica-
tion of the social gains that justify the huge costs of regulation.
The political effort to set the gap between market and regulation
only increases the level of social losses. There is no social case
for rent control in either the long or the short run.
IV. THE COMMUNITARIAN COUNTERATTACK
I have thus far urged that rent control statutes are per se
unconstitutional, and that this conclusion makes good sense
even if we expand our vision beyond constitutional text to take
into account its anticipated social effects. Rightly understood,
the just compensation clause of the Constitution directs us to a
theory of efficient regulation. The arguments are, I think, so con-
clusive that it is difficult to think of any neutral normative argu-
ment that could justify the use and spread of this system. The
economics profession is united over rent control, as it is not over
any other issue. The strength of the case is shown by the efforts
to circumvent it. There is simply no effort to show that misallo-
cations associated with rent control do not exist. Instead, the
justifications for rent control statutes take a very different turn.
While I cannot evaluate all of them here, it is instructive to look
briefly at one recent legal-philosophical effort provided by Pro-
fessor Radin 6
Professor Radin adopts the strategy of confession and
avoidance by explicitly rejecting all standard accounts of effi-
ciency, and invoking in their stead the "intuitive general rule"
that the interests of the landlord or of some potential tenant do
not reach the same level of dignity or strength as that of the
present tenant in possession. In a sense the argument dates back
to Justice Holmes in Block v. Hirsh, in which he observed, "The
preference given to the tenant in possession is an almost neces-
sary incident of the policy, and is traditional in English law."'67
"' Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 350 (1986).
67 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1920). There are no citations, and the point is overstated if not
wrong because it ignores all the incidents, such as wardship and marriage, that attach to
the tenant in possession, not to mention the excessive grounds for forfeiture. For an
account of the feudal system, see A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW (2d ed. 1986).
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In Radin's hand the argument appears clothed in somewhat dif-
ferent garb. A few quotations capture Radin's general gist: "The
intuitive general rule is that preservation of one's home is a
stronger claim than preservation of one's business, or that non-
commercial personal use of an apartment as a home is morally
entitled to more weight than purely commercial landlording."68
Again: "The intuitive general rule I just mentioned does not ap-
ply to would-be tenants. When we consider people who are te-
nants elsewhere and wish to become tenants in the rent-con-
trolled community, we are not struck with a similar general
intuition of a strong claim." 9
I confess that my intuitions are not so well developed as
Professor Radin's. If we do not stick with either Pareto or
Kaldor-Hicks, then the old utilitarian maxim that "every person
should count for one and only one" is a far better way to do
business. It is very risky to announce that some persons or some
roles count for more than others. Potential entrants to certain
markets are real people whose goals, aspirations, and desires
matter as much as those of present tenants. Opportunity costs
not only include unrealized gains that are unexperienced by
losers, but also their frustrations and disappointments in the
toilsome effort to find housing when supplies are tight and rents
are high. Once we intuit that certain positions, and hence certain
people, are special, then we have to determine just how special
they really are. In practice any overall inefficiency or inequity
can be justified by saying that the interests of a tenant in pos-
session (who has not protected himself by contract) is two, five,
or ten times that of some would-be person who wants to raise a
family in a decent environment, or to move back home after col-
lege to live near the family. It is often very difficult to know
whether neighborhood stability is a source of strength or stagna-
tion, and whether mobility is a sign of vitality or decay. The raw
turnover rates are not enough. Much depends upon how the de-
cisions to stay or go are made, and on this point rent control
systematically generates all the wrong incentives.
Professor Radin's principle cuts against the very idea of an
open society in which there is equal opportunity for advance-
ment and trade for all. The same principle could be used to jus-
e8 Radin, supra note 66, at 360.
Id. at 361.
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tify exclusionary zoning, including that which is based upon ra-
cial or ethnic grounds. Legal racial segregation had its
beneficiaries, which is why it survived. Radin's principle could
be used to justify the perpetuation of guild monopolies, on the
ground that workers in an established trade are entitled to pro-
tection that new rivals with advanced techniques are not allowed
to enjoy. It could be used to justify elaborate systems of price
supports for farmers, on the ground that established farmers
should not be subject to the heartaches of the market in their
quest to maintain a constant standard of living.70 And it can, of
course, be used to erect powerful barriers against immigration of
cheap foreign labor (my grandparents, for example) on the
ground that we attach some greater utility to established resi-
dents of the United States than we do to mere potential citizens
who wish to cross its borders. Economic accounts of efficiency
have been attacked countless times because they leave out of the
social equation fundamental concerns with justice and fairness
that are thought to be an inseparable part of our social life. How
ironic that those tests are the only ones that direct our attention
toward the overall effects of the purported regulation - includ-
ing the losses to landlords and potential tenants, as well as to
society at large - that the "communitarian" approaches ignore.
The social welfare standards of economists give no particular
favor to one class of individuals or occupations, but instead
point powerfully to the acceptance of the principle of freedom of
contract in markets that can approximate the competitive ideal.
My "intuitions" favor an open society in which persons
must purchase what they want from the owner of resources, and
not plan and scheme to get the state to operate on their behalf.
The cant about communitarian ideals offers a convenient cloak
to allow the "haves" to exclude those unlucky enough not to
have gotten there first. The constant iteration, also made by Ra-
1O The point rings true for Radin, who notes that one purpose of the rent control
laws is "to make it possible for existing tenants to stay where they are, with roughly the
same proportion of their income going to rent as they have become used to." Id. at 352-
53. This is similar to the idea that farmers should continue to enjoy the level of prosper-
ity they had in the best of times through a system of tax-supported minimum prices.
As an aside, Radin's general proposition about rent control describes only the rare
rent control or stabilization statutes, like San Jose's. Regulated prices are determined
uniformly without regard to tenant income. Indeed, one of the distributional shames of
the system is that it tends to provide large subsidies to older tenants with substantial
incomes.
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din, that residential housing is not just another market good has
been heard before. Labor unions have often said that labor is
not an article of commerce, but they do not withdraw them-
selves from sale; they charge a monopoly price. Medical and le-
gal services have been sharply restricted on the grounds that no
"noble profession" should have to face the competition of low-
cost producers. Oil and gas are special commodities that should
be protected against cheaper imports because they are necessary
to protect the national security of the United States.71 The claim
for special communities is simply a disguised appeal for special
monopoly privileges that should be rejected across the board, re-
gardless of the guise under which it appears. There is simply no
standard of social welfare that justifies the operation of the rent
control statutes in any form.
The real questions of policy that should be debated are
those concerning the legal transition rules that should govern
the move toward deregulation. As always, it is far more difficult
to return to unregulated markets than it is to maintain them in
the first place, given the reliance interests that grow under the
new regime, and the powerful political forces that work to keep
them in place. The easiest solution is one whereby courts would
do two things: first, ban any new rent control stabilization ordi-
nance; and second, order the inexorable relaxation of current re-
strictions by raising existing caps by, say, 10 percent a year,
every year, until the restrictions hover harmlessly far above mar-
ket prices.
The questions over rent control go to the heart of what pri-
vate property and free markets are about. It should not be sur-
prising to find that there is a powerful congruence between what
the Constitution requires as a matter of textual interpretation,
and what the theory of efficient regulation requires as a matter
of sound social policy. It is therefore something of an anticipated
tragedy that we continue to move heavily in the direction of
more and more government regulation of the housing markets.
Our achievement is in a sense unique, for we have managed to
71 See, e.g., Baden, A Welfare Plan for U.S. Oil, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1987, at 22, col.
4, which attacks Texas Governor Clement's proposal for a minimum $20 per barrel price
of domestic oil. Baden was strongly attacked in letters to the editor written by benefi-
ciaries of the proposal. See, e.g., Weinstein & Gross, Well-Oiled Libertarian Trap, Wall
St. J., Jan. 26, 1988, at 37, col. 1.
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forge legal arrangements for rental housing that simultaneously
offend both explicit constitutional norms and sound economic
theory.
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